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WORLDS ARE COLLIDING:
A CRITIQUE OF THE NEED FOR THE
ADDITIONAL CRIMINAL SECURITIES
FRAUD SECTION IN SARBANES-
OXLEY
On July 30, 2002, Congress passed H.R. 3763, better known
as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20021 ("Sarbanes-Oxley" or "the
Act"), in an effort to "protect investors by improving the accuracy
and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the secu-
rities laws, and for other purposes.",2 This legislation was in re-
sponse to the onslaught of corporate scandals that resulted in the
near annihilation of former corporate superpowers such as Enron,
Arthur Anderson, and WorldCom. In passing the bill, Congress
sought to "protect the people of this country ... [and to] make sure
corporate America can do its best to help our economy." 3 Con-
gress attempted to "create tough new penalties for securities fraud
and ... preserve evidence of fraud to make sure there is account-
ability for crimes that not only cheat investors but rob the markets
themselves of the public trust.",
4
One commentator has referred to the Act as "the most far-
reaching series of changes to the laws on corporate governance and
disclosure and accounting oversight since the federal securities
laws were enacted 70 years ago."' While its goal is commendable,
this legislation is broad and overreaching for several reasons.
While the SEC has recently come under fire for proposing rules
pursuant to Sarbanes-Oxley which may compromise the attorney-
client privilege and conflict with state ethical codes, 6 a less publi-
cized provision of the Act may have similar, far-reaching effects
1 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (to be codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 7201) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley].
2 Id. at preamble.
3 148 CONG. REC. S6437 (daily ed. July 9, 2002) (statement of Sen. Daschle).
4 Id.
5 John J. Falvey Jr. and Matthew A. Wolfman, The Criminal Provisions of Sarbanes-
Oxley: A Tale of Sound and Fury, 13 INS. COVERAGE LITIG. REP. 23 (December 11, 2002)
[hereinafter Sound and Fury].
6 Implementation of Standards of Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2003).
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on securities markets, securities lawyers, securities professionals,
and others who must quickly comply with the newly enacted legis-
lation. Title VIII, section 807 of Sarbanes-Oxley is entitled
"Criminal penalties for defrauding shareholders of publicly traded
companies" 7 and is designed to implement an allegedly new "no
tolerance" policy in the securities industry by punishing fraudulent
statements and transactions in securities markets.8
In Senator Leahy's section-by-section analysis of Sarbanes-
Oxley presented to the Senate on July 26, 2002, the Senator stated
that "[c]urrenty, unlike bank fraud or health care fraud, there is no
generally accessible statute that deals with the specific problem of
securities fraud." 9 Senator Leahy went on to assert that federal
prosecutors are left to resort to a "patchwork of technical ... of-
fenses and regulations" or to treat the violations as "generic mail
or wire fraud cases and to meet the technical elements of those
statutes, with their five year maximum penalties."' As this Com-
ment will point out, Senator Leahy's comments on this subject are
misguided and ignore the presence of a plethora of criminal securi-
ties fraud statutes which are neither "technical" nor "patchwork"
when compared to the section enacted under the umbrella of Sar-
banes-Oxley.
Part I of this Comment will analyze the legislative history of
Sarbanes-Oxley and discuss the new criminal provision for securi-
ties fraud contained in section 807 of the Act. Part II of this
Comment will address section 17 of the Securities Act" and sec-
tion 10 of the Exchange Act,' 2 the two main already-existing secu-
rities fraud statutes available to federal prosecutors. Further com-
mentary will point to several other federal statutes commonly used
to prosecute securities fraud and briefly comment on how those
have historically been applied. Finally, Part III will address the
weaknesses of the Sarbanes-Oxley securities fraud statute, demon-
strating that there is little or no difference between that statute and
the securities fraud laws already in place.
7 Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 1, § 807.
I d. § 807. The statutory language of this section and a detailed discussion are contained
in Part I of this Comment, infra.
9 148 CONG. REC. S7418 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
10 Id.
11 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2002).
12 Id. § 78j.
[Vol. 53:839
WORLDS ARE COLLIDING
I. AN OVERVIEW OF SARBANES-OXLEY SECURITIES FRAUD
PROVISIONS
It is unmistakable that the introduction and passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was sparked by the various corporate
accounting scandals around the country, most notably the mis-
deeds in accounting treatment at Enron and WorldCom, as well as
officer and director greed contributing to the downfall of Tyco and
Adelphia.13  These scandals contributed not only to the rapid
downward trend in the stock market over the past three years, but
also in thousands of lost jobs rippling out from the companies
themselves to hundreds of other companies who depended on these
corporate giants for business. 14 It was against this background that
Sarbanes-Oxley was introduced and ultimately sped through Con-
gress on a 99-0 vote in the Senate and a 423-3 vote in the House.
In signing the law, President Bush remarked, "No more easy
money for corporate criminals- just hard time.'
' 5
President Bush was, of course, referring to the new white-
collar criminal penalties introduced by the Act in order to deter the
types of conduct typified by the highly publicized corporate scan-
dals over the past few years. What follows is a brief overview and
summary of the Act's key securities fraud provision, section 807,
in order to establish a context for further discussion of the federal
securities law statutes.
The new criminal securities fraud provision in Sarbanes-
Oxley is contained in section 807 of the Act and is entitled
"Criminal penalties for defrauding shareholders of publicly traded
companies."' 6 This section states:
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a
scheme or artifice-
(1) To defraud any person in connection with any security of
an issuer with a class of securities registered under section 12
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 781) or
13 See Sound and Fury, supra note 5.
14 See 148 CONG. REC. S10,563 (daily ed. October 16, 2002) (statement of Sen. Levin).
In his remarks, Sen. Levin opined that the only people who emerged from the Enron fiasco
unscathed were corporate executives who escaped with millions of dollars. Sen. Levin further
noted that corporate scandals have infected not only Wall Street, but also everyday America,
where over half of American households have equity security investments.
15 Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary of the White House, President Bush Signs
Corporate Corruption Bill (July 30, 2002) (on file with author).
16 Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 1, § 807.
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that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Secu-
rities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)); or
(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, rep-
resentations, or promises, any money or property in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security of an issuer
with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 781) or that is
required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d));
Shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than 25
years, or both.' 7
Senator Leahy, the primary author and major impetus behind
the Act's criminal provisions, stated in his floor remarks on the
bill that the Act's terms do not embrace the technical definitions in
the securities laws but rather are intended to provide "the needed
enforcement flexibility in the context of publicly traded companies
to protect shareholders and prospective shareholders against all
types of schemes and frauds which inventive criminals may devise
in the future."'' 8
Historically, federal regulation of securities transactions has
been accomplished through the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities
Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and
the rules and regulations promulgated under the authority of those
acts. However, the criminal securities fraud provision under Sar-
banes-Oxley will not be included as an amendment to these Acts
or codified alongside them. Instead, the new criminal securities
fraud provision stands independent and is codified at 18 U.S.C.
§1348. Furthermore, as the following Section of this Comment
will demonstrate, the ingenuity of section 807 is minimal and was
an unnecessary addition to the Act.' 9 Even a brief examination of
federal securities jurisprudence reveals that fraudulent conduct and
transactions proscribed by section 807 have been illegal and prose-
cuted under federal laws in place since 1933.
17 Id.
18 148 CONG. REC. S7418 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
'9 See John F.X. Peloso and Stuart M. Sarnoff, Securities Litigation and Enforcement, TheSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Whom Does It Affect and How?, 228 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2002) (stating
that the enactment of section 807 in Sarbanes-Oxley may be an example of legislative overkill).
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II. EXISTING FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS IN PLACE TO PREVENT
FRAUDULENT SECURITIES PRACTICES
A. The Securities Act of 1933 and Relevant Criminal Sanctions
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the De-
partment of Justice since 1933 under the Securities Act have had
several provisions available to prosecute and convict individuals
suspected of securities fraud, irrespective of Sarbanes-Oxley. The
"hub" provision in this respect is section 24, which states:
Any person who willfully violates any provision of this title,
or the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission
under authority thereof, or any person who willfully, in a
registration filed under this title, makes any untrue statement
of a material fact, or omits to state any material fact required
to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading, shall upon conviction be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.2 °
The statement "any provision of this title, or the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Commission" brings the whole Se-
curities Act within the scope of section 24 and makes it a federal
crime to violate any section, rule, or regulation of the Securities
Act. Most importantly, this section brings within its scope viola-
tions of sections 5 and 17 of the Securities Act.
2E
Section 5 has three main requirements integral to improving
disclosure in securities transactions. First, it requires that a regis-
tration statement be filed with the SEC before any offers to sell,
solicitations of offers to buy, or offers to buy may be made.
22 Sec-
ond, it requires that a registration statement be in effect before any
sales of securities may be consummated.2 3 Third, it regulates the
content of prospectuses used in the sale of securities and mandates
the availability of these disclosure mechanisms at some point dur-
ing the sale of securities.24
Section 17 of the Securities Act is aimed at deceptive prac-
tices in the sale of securities to purchasers. This section makes it
unlawful, in the sale of securities, to:
20 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2002) (emphasis added).
21 Id. § 77e, q.
22 Id. § 77e(c).
23 Id. § 77e(a).
2 Id. § 77e(b).
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(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements make, in
light of the circumstances under which they were made not
misleading; or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon the purchaser.25
In their treatise on securities regulation, Professors Louis Loss
and Joel Seligman26 note that section 17 marked an advance over
other criminal statutes formerly used to prosecute securities fraud,
namely.the mail fraud statute. 27 They point out that section 17 was
"specifically tailored to the securities field," and that the law
speaks in terms of "material misstatements" and "half truths. 28
Thus, by applying section 24 to section 17 violations, it is clear
that section 17 violations can be prosecuted under federal law, and
that such violations, by encompassing material misstatements and
half-truths, are designed to prevent and punish fraudulent securi-
ties transactions. The penalty for such a violation, contained in
section 24, is five years imprisonment or a fine of $10,000, or
both.2 9 Sentencing in such cases is now subject to the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines.
From the foregoing, it is evident that prior to the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley federal prosecutors had ample opportunity to re-
quire disclosure and prosecute punish fraud in the securities mar-
kets by resorting to sections 5 and 17 of the Securities Act of 1933.
Furthermore, as will be more fully developed in Part III of this
Comment, applications of these sections are rather simple and
straightforward and cast a wide net to prevent fraud and to protect
investors.
25 Id. § 7 7q.
.26 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATIONS § 9-A-I (3d ed. 2001).
27 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2002). The federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, has also
been frequently been used to prosecute deception in connection with securities transactions.28 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 26, § 9-A-I.
29 15 U.S.C. § 77x.
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B. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Relevant Criminal
Provisions
The Securities Exchange Act of 193430 contains anti-fraud
protection similar to that found in section 17 of the Securities Act.
Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act serves the same purpose as sec-
tion 24 of the Securities Act and makes it unlawful for one to vio-
late any provision of the Securities Act. Within its proscriptions
is section 10(b), which makes it unlawful for any person to:
Use or employ, with the purchase or sale of any security reg-
istered on a national securities exchange or any security not
so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or con-
trivance in contravention of such rules and regulations ... for
the protection of investors.32
Under the authority to adopt rules and regulations pursuant to
Exchange Act section 10(b), the SEC adopted Rule lOb-5 contain-
ing language similar to that found in Securities Act section 17.
Rule lOb-5 makes it unlawful for any person:
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any per-
son, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.33
Under section 32(a), the penalties for violating Rule lOb-5 are
up to twenty years imprisonment, a fine of up to $5 million, or
both.34 Similar to violations of the Securities Act, sentencing for
these crimes is subject to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. As
will be discussed in the following Sections, the application and
interpretation of Rule lOb-5 is substantially similar to that of sec-
tion 17 of the Securities Act.35 Furthermore, there is a plethora of
case law interpreting the terms used in Rule lOb-5 as applied to
30 d.§ 78.
I' d. § 78ff(a).
32 Id. § 78j(b).
33 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2002).
34 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
-5 See discussion infra Part H.C.
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securities violations, and, despite Senator Leahy's statements to
the contrary, this rule has been used frequently to prosecute and
send securities violators to federal prison.36
C. Applications of the Criminal Sanctions in the Securities and the
Exchange Acts
In interpreting and applying the criminal sanctions contained
in the 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Exchange Act, it becomes
important to define and focus on the conduct which is proscribed.
By flushing out the meaning of terms such as "willfully," "know-
ingly," "fact," "falsity, "materiality," "misstatements," and "half-
truths," which are used in both the Securities Act and the Ex-
change Act anti-fraud provisions,37 one can see that many of the
violations inherent in the corporate frauds over the past few years
were subject to prosecution under already-existing federal securi-
ties laws.
As with many legislative enactments, the proscriptions con-
tained in section 17 of the Securities Act and rule lOb-5 of the Ex-
change Act are modeled after the common law, specifically com-
mon law notions of fraud and deceit. 38 Loss and Seligman argue
that the most liberal notions of common law deceit should be ap-
plied to these statutes, given the "gross inequality of bargaining
power between the professional securities firm and the average
investor. ' 39 Courts have frequently held that the anti-fraud provi-
sions in the Securities Act and the Exchange Act are not limited to
conduct which would give rise to a common law action for fraud
or deceit.40 In addition, judicial opinions on the subject have
wisely resisted constructing a hard and fast definition of fraud forfear of enabling the most wily of violators to conceive of ways to
36 For example, a defendant convicted of violating section 17 and Rule 1Ob-5 in connec-
tion with manipulating the market price of a security to reap profit from appreciation of theprice was sentenced to a concurrent three-year prison term for his role in the fraud. United
States v. Rubinson, 543 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1976).
37 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q, 77x, 78ff(a), 78j.
-8 See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 26, § 9-A-2 (stating that "[s]tatutes build on thecommon law and, especially when statutes are new, judges and lawyers who are trained in the
common law are apt to look to it for guidance").
39 Id.; see also Marketlines, Inc. v. SEC, 384 F.2d 264, 266 (2d Cir. 1967) (stating that itis the SEC's duty to protect the gullible, and thus, advertisements may be judged by their impact
on the market segment at which they are targeted).




evade the law.4 ' To this end, courts have found it the better prac-
tice to deal with each case on its own facts.42
In determining whether a statement is true or false, one must
first determine whether the statement is in fact capable of being
true or false; namely, whether it pur orts to be a statement of fact
or is merely the declarant's opinion. 3 In 1896, the Supreme Court
stated in a case brought under the Federal Mail Fraud statute that
to make a promise which one does not intend to perform or to de-
clare a baseless opinion as to future events is a fraud and may be
punished as a scheme or artifice to defraud despite the fact that it
is a representation and promise about the future.44 Following this
lead, the SEC has held valuations, geological reports, and similar
statements that, though they may be regarded as opinions, to be
based on implied representations that professional standards have
been followed.45 If one holds oneself out to be an expert and does
not follow these standards, an implied factual misrepresentation is
involved. 46 The notion of "puffing" has virtually become extinct
in the securities law context.47 Thus, in the securities field, if one
desires to boast about the value, performance, or qualities of one's
goods or services, one must be sure that such a statement is clearly
a statement of opinion and based on reasonable and justifiable
facts.48  While such good-faith representations may be shielded
from liability, the district court in Alfaro v. E.F. Hutton & Co. 49
held that some expressions of opinion may still be actionable un-
der section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 where such "opinions or predic-
tions [are] not made in good faith or made with knowledge that are
not based upon a sound, factual or historical basis. 5°
41 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); State v. Whiteaker,
118 Or. 656 (1926).
42 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 26, § 9-A-2.
43 Given that the notion of fraud as used in these statutes is based on the common law, the
distinction between opinion and fact becomes relevant due to the common law definition of
fraud: A false representation of a material fact, known to be false, made for the purpose of in-
ducing one to rely on it, and on which the person does so rely with resulting damage. Id.
44 Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896).
45 Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 534 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1976); Alfaro v. E.F. Hutton
& Co., 606 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1985); see also Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 26, §9-A-2.
46 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 26, §9-A-2.
47 Id.; see also Knox v. Anderson, 159 F. Supp. 795, 806 (D. Haw. 1958) ("Buyer beware
lingers now only in the argument of the lawyers.").
48 See Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 672 F. Supp. 1552, 1563 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding
that statements about "unequalled strength" and "expertise," defined by the court as "aren't we
great egoism that characterizes much of corporate America," are clearly statements of opinion
and that, under SEC law, "a reasonable and justified statement of opinion, one with a sound
factual or historical basis, is not actionable."), aff'd & rev'd in part on other grounds, 886 F.2d
1109 (9th Cir. 1989).
49 606 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
50 Id. at 1104.
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In determining what facts may be designated as "material,"
the Supreme Court stated in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc.51 that in the proxy rule context, a fact is material if "there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider
it important in deciding how to vote." 52 This definition has been
followed in other securities law cases, including suits brought un-
der Rule lOb-5. 3 In fact, the Supreme Court in Basic v. Levinson54
expressly adopted the TCS Industries standard of materiality in
applications of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 55 There is also prece-
dent for the view that a matter is material if "the maker of the rep-
resentation knows or has reason to know that its recipient regards
or is likely to regard the matter as important ... although a reason-
able man would not so regard it."56 Furthermore, omissions of ma-
terial facts in statements made to persons with financial sophistica-
tion are not excused by the recipient's financial acumen.57
The issue of materiality has frequently arisen in the context of
merger negotiations. A typical situation addressing the sensitivity
of corporate responsibilities in merger negations arose in Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, where the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
materiality in this context. The Court held that information does
not become material simply because of a public statement denying
it, but that "once a statement is made denying the existence of any
discussions, even discussions that might not have been material in
absence of the denial are material because they make the statement
made untrue." 59 Ultimately, many courts have adopted what has
become known as the "mosaic theory," under which each individ-
ual piece of information at issue must be evaluated in the context
of the overall impression created by the statements as a whole. 60
In determining materiality, "[w]hat might be considered innocuous
'puffery' or a mere statement of opinion standing alone may be
actionable as an integral part of a representation of a material fact
51 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
52 Id. at 449. For the proxy rules, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (2002). The proxy rules bar
the use of proxy statements that are false or misleading with respect to the disclosure or omis-
sion of material facts. In TCS, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant companies issued proxy
statements without disclosing the amount of control exerted by the acquiring company over the
target. Id. at 441-42.
5- Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 26, §9-A-2.
54 485 U.S. 224 (1998).
55 Id. at 232.
56 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538(2)(b)(1 980)).
57 Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon and Co., 588 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1978).
58 485 U.S. 224.
51 id. at 237.
60 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 26, §9-A-2.
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when used to emphasize and induce reliance upon such a represen-
tation.",
61
The meaning of the terms "willfully" and "knowingly" be-
comes critical when assessing culpability under both the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act. Under section 24 of the Securities Act,
one cannot be found guilty absent a showing of a willful violation
of a provision of the Securities Act.62 Similar terms are found in
the Exchange Act where willful and knowing violations of that Act
are proscribed.63
As applied in section 5 of the Securities Act, which provides
for itemized disclosure control over securities transactions, the
term "willfully" refers to the violator's knowledge of the absence
of a registration statement or the failure to deliver a prospectus. In
the context of conspiring to sell unregistered securities, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that the elements of
knowledge and willfulness under federal securities law require a
showing that the defendant either knew, or deliberately closed his
eyes to, the necessity of registering the stock before selling it.64 In
United States v. Rubinson, the prosecution satisfied this require-
ment by showing that the defendants, inter alia, engaged in "fur-
tive and roundabout dealings," received warning of illegality from
their lawyers, and that the defendants "laundered" their stock
through a company in an attempt to avoid registration.65 For his
part in the securities scheme, defendant Rubinson was sentenced to
a three-year consecutive term in federal prison.66
As applied in the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities and
Exchange Acts, "willfully" refers to knowledge of the falsity or
omission with gross negligence or indifference as to the facts.67
Occasionally, when applying the penal provisions of the Securities
and Exchange Acts, courts have struggled with the question of
whether "willfully" and "knowingly" refer to a knowledge of the
underlying facts and of the law being violated, or if those terms
merely require knowledge of the facts giving rise to the violation.
61 Casella v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 1989).
62 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2002).
63 See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) ("[N]o person shall be subject to imprisonment under this sec-
tion for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule
or regulation").
64 United States v. Rubinson, 543 F.2d 951,959 (2d Cir. 1976).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 954. It is important to note that Rubinson was simultaneously charged and con-
victed for conspiracy to violate section 17(b) of the Securities Act. Rubinson's co-defendants
were charged with and convicted of conspiracy to violate sections 5 and 17(b). Two of them
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Some courts have found that the terms must be applied separately
and require independent proof.68 However, in subsequent cases,
the same courts change their decisions and hold that the terms
"willfully" and "knowingly" do not require the government to
prove the element of specific intent to defraud.6 9 Other courts
have held that a conviction under section 32(a) can be both "will-
ful" and "knowing" when based upon "reckless, deliberate indif-
ference to or disregard for truth and falsity. 7 °
An examination of case law demonstrates that the willfulness
and knowledge requirements do not present an unattainable burden
for prosecutors in punishing fraudulent securities transactions. In
United States v. Lilley,7t the district court held that the defendants
could not avail themselves of the "no knowledge" clause in section
32(a) of the Exchange Act because proof of "no knowledge" can
only mean ignorance of the substance of the rule. In other words,
the defendant must be completely unaware of the illegality of his
actions. 72 In Lilley, the defendants manipulated the prices of cer-
tain securities while at the same time purchasing substantial
amounts of those securities in order to create the appearance of an
active market in the stock. 73  Such conduct was generally pro-
scribed by sections 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act as fraudulent. While the defendants admitted
they were aware that securities fraud was illegal, they contended
that they were unaware of the specific section under which their
conduct was illegal, namely section 9(a)(2) of the Exchange Act 74
which proscribes price manipulation. The court found this argu-
ment unpersuasive and held that it was enough that each defendant
knew his conduct was manipulative and that securities fraud was
illegal. It did not matter that the defendants alleged no knowledge
that manipulative conduct was fraudulent. 75
68 See United States v. Peltzn, 433 F.2d 48, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1970).
69 See United States v. Schwartz, 464 F.2d 499, 509 (2d Cir. 1972) ("Proof of a specific
intent to violate the law is not necessary to uphold a conviction under § 32(a) of the [Exchange]
Act, provided that satisfactory proof is established that the defendant intended to commit the act
prohibited.").
70 United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 786-87 (9th Cir. 1978).
71 291 F. Supp. 989 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
72 Id. at 993.
73 Id. at 991.
74 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (2002).
75 Lilley, 291 F. Supp. at 993.
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III. ADDRESSING THE NEED FOR CRIMINAL SECURITIES PROVISIONS
IN SARBANES-OXLEY
Against the background laid out in Parts I and II, the glaring
hole in Senator Leahy's statement that there are no criminal penal-
ties for securities fraud becomes evident. It also raises the ques-
tion: "Why did the legislature insert this section into the Act when
it adds nothing to the already existing securities fraud laws?" In
fact, an examination of the language contained in section 807 of
Sarbanes-Oxley reveals that it covers virtually identical transac-
tions and conduct as the language in the Securities Act and Ex-
change Act, and in some cases, is substantially less protective of
investors than its counterpart provision in the Securities Act.
First of all, it is important to recognize Congress's good inten-
tions in attempting to strengthen the penalties for defrauding in-
vestors in a securities market in desperate need of renewed inves-
tor confidence. However, instead of further complicating securi-
ties law by inserting this new criminal provision into Sarbanes-
Oxley, the same ends could have been attained via different and
simpler means - merely amending the current provisions of the
Securities Act to raise the penalties for violations of the anti-fraud
provisions already on the books. Currently, the penalty for violat-
ing section 24 of the Securities Act is up to five years imprison-
ment, a $10,000 fine, or both.76 In contrast, a violation of section
807 may result in a prison sentence of up to twenty-five years in
addition to a substantial fine.77 However, the substantive anti-
fraud language in section 807 adds nothing new to existing securi-
ties law, except for increased fines and jail terms.
Section 807(1) proscribes attempts to defraud any person in
connection with the securities of an issuer who has a class of secu-
rities registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act or that is
required to file reports under section 15 of the Exchange Act and is
substantially similar to subsections (1) and (3) of rule lOb-5 under
the Exchange Act and subsection (1) of section 17 under the Secu-
rities Act.
As noted in Part II of this Comment, rule lOb-5(1) makes it
unlawful for one to "employ any scheme, device, or artifice to de-
fraud. 7 8 If this were not enough, the rule goes even further, pro-
scribing any attempt to "engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
76 15 U.S.C. § 77x.
77 Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 1, § 807.
78 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(1) (2002).
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any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity.,, 79 Reading these two sections together, there would appear to
be no securities transaction that would be found unlawful under
section 807(1) of Sarbanes-Oxley that would not also be found
unlawful under rulelOb-5 subsections (1) and (3).
Additionally, section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act provides
further protection against fraudulent securities transactions and
would operate in a substantially greater number of circumstances
than either rule lOb-5 or section 807. Recall from Part II of this
Comment that section 17(a)(1) makes it unlawful for one to "em-
ploy any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud., 80  Furthermore,
subsection (3) of that section makes it unlawful for one "to engage
in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser."'', This
language is substantially similar to that found in rule lOb-5 and
would seem to operate in the same instances as the provisions in
that rule and in section 807. However, the protections afforded
those transacting in securities is even greater under section 17 and
rule lOb-5 than those granted under section 807. While section
807 is only applicable to transactions in securities of companies
registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act or companies re-
quired to file reports under section 15(d) of the Exchange Act,82
neither section 17 nor rule lOb-5 contain such limiting language.
Thus, the anti-fraud provisions of section 17 would cover any se-
curities transaction, regardless of the size of the transaction or the
size of the company against whom the security represents a claim,
and regardless of the type of security changing hands.83
While section 807(1) would seem to muddy the securities wa-
ters enough, Congress also included within Sarbanes-Oxley section
807(2) which makes it unlawful for one "to obtain, by means of
false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any
money or property in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security of an issuer."'84 This section creates an even greater prob-
lem for those who wish to comply with securities law than the sec-
tion previously discussed.
79 Id. § 240.1Ob-5(3).
80 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(1).
sI Id. § 771(a)(3).
82 Id. at § 78; Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 1, § 807.
83 This proposition is strengthened by section 2(a)(3) of the Securities Act, which defines
"security" as used in the Securities Act. This definition encompasses instruments ranging from
interests oil, gas or other mineral rights to puts, calls, and straddles, options and privileges on
any security, to any instrument or interest commonly known as a "security." 15 U.S.C. §
77b(a)(3).
84 Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note I, § 807(2).
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At the outset, subsection (2) contains several words that are
vague and undefined within the Act. The problem follows that,
until case law is developed to define words such as "false or
fraudulent pretenses" and "false promises," those transacting in
securities will be skating on thin ice while wondering whether
their transactions fall within the ambit of the law.
Furthermore, section 807 adds nothing to already existing se-
curities law. Securities professionals have already begun to com-
ment that the "new" securities laws are little more than "sound and
fury signifying nothing. 85 In fact, in the months leading up to the
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, then-Chairman of the SEC Harvey Pitt
testified before Congress that he saw no need for new laws prohib-
iting securities fraud and that laws were already on the books
which have been available to adequately protect investors from
fraudulent practices.86 Furthermore, the SEC's Associate Director
of Enforcement Thomas Newkirk remarked after the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley that "the underlying difficulties in criminal prose-
cutions are going to remain relatively the same despite the new
provisions.
87
At first blush, the new law seems to alter existing securities
law in two respects. First, the new law does not explicitly require
proof of "willfulness" on the part of the violator in order for sec-
tion 807 to apply.88 However, the statute does require proof of an
intent to deceive investors. Only time will tell how courts will
choose to interpret the word "intent" as used in this context, but
clearly it is hard to imagine that it will be interpreted in such a
manner which would make it significantly easier to show "intent"
as opposed to the "willfulness" requirement under the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act.
Second, the new law applies to fraudulent practices "in con-
nection with any security," whereas traditional securities law has
dealt with fraud linked to the purchase or sale of securities.
89
However, this distinction is just as unlikely to have a significant
effect on securities law prosecutions. First of all, once a prosecu-
tor is able to show fraud with respect to financial statements or in
any other context, it is not hard to make an additional showing that
85 See Sound and Fury, supra note 5, at 24.
86 Hearing on the Enron Matter Before the House Subcommittee on Capitol Markets,
Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Harvey L.
Pitt, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission).
87 Richard Hill, SEC Official Tells Seminar New Law May Not Increase Successful Prose-
cutions, 34 BNA SEC. L. & REG. REP. 33, at 1380 (Aug. 19, 2002).
88 See Sound and Fury, supra note 5, at 24-25.
89 Id. at 25.
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the fraud was in connection with the "purchase and sale of any se-
curity. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recently refused to
adopt a narrow interpretation of the "purchase or sale" requirement
in securities law in SEC v. Zandford.91 In Zandford, the defendant-
broker sold securities from his clients' accounts and then used the
proceeds from the sale for his own benefit without the clients'
knowledge or consent. Initially, the court reiterated its position
that rule lOb-5 should not be technically construed, but should be
read to "effectuate its remedial purpose." 92 The Court further
stated that "neither the SEC nor this Court has ever held that there
must be a misrepresentation about the value of a particular security
in order to run afoul of the Act." Ultimately, the Court held that "
in the context of a violation of § 10(b) of the [Exchange Act], it is
enough that the scheme or artifice to defraud and the sale of secu-
rities coincide." 9
3
However, the new law is not completely devoid of novel cov-
erage of securities transactions. In a situation where fraud is pre-
sent in a securities transaction which does not contain either the
purchase or sale of securities, the new laws would provide relief
where section 17 and rule lOb-5 did not. Such a case may exist in
a hypothetical situation where a corrupt broker tricks a client into
transferring him ownership of the client's securities without actu-
ally purchasing or selling securities as part of the fraud.94 This
type of transaction, while not covered by the Securities or Ex-
change Acts, would still be prosecuted under the mail or wire
fraud statutes, so to the extent that lawmakers intended to create
new criminal liability in this area, the statute misses the point.
CONCLUSION
This Comment is not intended to minimize the importance of
Sarbanes-Oxley in the context of improving disclosure by public
corporations and restoring public confidence in the securities mar-
kets and the business world as a whole. However, this Comment
emphasizes that when the legislature desires to address such a
situation, and it does so through broad and sweeping legislation, it
should take the time to make sure that it is actually doing what it
purports to do.
90 Id.
91 535 U.S. 813 (2002).92 Id. at 819.
91 Id. at 903-04.
94 Sound and Fury, supra note 5, at 25.
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It became evident when scandals such as Enron began to
break that definitive action would have to be taken to cure the ills
of corporate America. To this end, Congress came together, held
hearings, subpoenaed documents, and passed legislation in an at-
tempt to prevent future scandals and punish those that precipitated
the current crises.95 However, it is far less clear that the proper
response is to pass what is essentially an "off the cuff' response to
these problems without first taking the time to reflect and analyze
the best possible methods to remedy any given situation. While
the duplicity of federal securities fraud statutes is a somewhat in-
nocuous problem, 96 only time will tell how the rest of the Act and
the rules promulgated under its authority will affect not only cor-
porate America, but the average, everyday American who is left to
endure the harsh reality of an economy driven by individual decep-
tion and greed.
PHILLIP WESLEY LAMBERTt
95 See 148 CONG. REC. S10,563 (daily ed. October 16, 2002) (statement of Sen. Levin)
(stating that Sarbanes-Oxley was a strong response to these corporate misdeeds, but that Con-
gress's work was far from over).
96 See Sound and Fury, supra note 5, at 25 (noting that while the previous securities fraud
statutes will probably remain on the books, prosecutors will be more inclined to bring cases
under section 807 given the gravity of its maximum penalties and the deterrent value it carries).
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